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PANEL I
IN PRAISE OF WOODENNESS
Gary Lawson*

Not long ago, I was a stalwart champion of judicial terrorism on behalf
of economic liberty. In recent years, however, I have become a meek, mildmannered originalist whose favorite adjective is "wooden."' I still like economic liberty as much as the next person - in fact, more than at least one of
the next two persons. Nonetheless, much as I would like to, I cannot agree
that the Constitution requires a free market to the extent urged by, among
others, Roger Pilon, Bernard Siegan,3 Steven Macedo, 4 Randy Barnett,5
and Richard Epstein. 6 My aim here is not to criticize their particular argu* Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern Universty Scho6l of Law. I am grateful to the
Civil Liability Program at Yale Law School for support.
1. The term is often used as an epithet to describe stiff and formalistic methods of legal
reasoning. See, e.g., Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 323 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court today applies the rules for construing waivers of sovereign immunity in
a wooden and archaic fashion"); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) ("the
Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' ").
It is less often explained why stiffness and formalism are necessarily bad things when one is
interpreting texts.
2. See Pilon, Economic Liberty, the Constitution, and the Higher Law, infra p. 27.
3. See B. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution (1980).
4. See S. Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution (1986).
5. See Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservatism v. A Principled Judicial Activism, 10
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 273 (1987).
6. See R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985);
Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contracts Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703 (1984);
Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987). In apparent
contrast to these other scholars, all of whom place great weight on the so-called "open-ended"
clauses of the Constitution - the due process clauses, the fourteenth amendment's privileges or
immunities clause, and the ninth amendment, Professor Epstein relies principally on relatively
wooden constructions of the takings, contracts, and commerce clauses. Methodologically, he
would therefore seem to be friend more than foe, whether or not one accepts his substantive
arguments. To a large extent this is true. See R. Epstein, supra, at 19-31. The problem, which
Professor Epstein acknowledges, see id. at 18, is that his text-based takings clause and
commerce clause arguments apply only to federal regulation of economic activity. To protect
economic liberty from state regulation, one must either make the contracts clause bear a very
heavy load or find some way to pull economic liberties out of the ninth or fourteenth
Amendments (by incorporation or otherwise). I note in this regard that Professor Epstein has
endorsed substantive due process on more than one occasion.
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ments, but rather to draw attention to a more general methodological problem
- really a meta-problem pertaining to interpretation as such - that largely
determines the extent to which their arguments can peacefully coexist with a
wooden originalist interpretation of the Constitution.
Before posing that problem, however, I want to clarify what it means to
be a wooden originalist in light of Roger Pilon's discussion of the moral
foundations of constitutionalism.7 I use "wooden originalism" to describe an
interpretative method in which one identifies the ordinary meanings that the
Constitution's words, read in linguistic, structural, and historical context,
had at the time of the document's origin - a method is often misleadingly labelled simply "originalism" or "interpretivism." I offer no elaborate defense
of this methodology, nor is one necessary. Given some fairly modest assumptions about linguistic determinacy that are hard to contest without selfcontradiction, to say that it is the best method for discovering the meaning of
an instruction manual like the Constitution9 comes very close to being true by
definition.
However, what is not so clear, and what does not logically follow from
wooden originalism's interpretative primacy, is why judges and other public
officials ought to use wooden originalism to decide constitutional questions

7. See Pilon, supra note 2.
8. 1 have not cast aside these more familiar labels lightly. A viable theory of textual
interpretation must both identify a set of factors to be used in interpretation and give those
factors a temporal dimension. Interpretivism does the former but not the latter, declaring that
one should look for meaning only to the Constitution's text, structure, and history, but not
specifying the point in time at which the meanings of the document's words or structure must
be fixed. Originalism does the latter but not the former, directing attention to the text's time
of origin, but not prescribing which interpretative factors are relevant. Originalism need not be
For example, a nonoriginalist
interpretivist, and interpretivism need not be originalist.
interpretivist might give the words of the Constitution their present-day ordinary meanings,
rather than the meanings they would have had to an eighteenth-or nineteenth-century audience.
Similarly, a noninterpretivist originalist might read into the Constitution eighteenth-or
nineteenth-century, rather than current or evolving, fundamental values or transcendent moral
principles. My method is thus a species of interpretivist originalism. That label, however, is
broad enough to include theories that treat certain historical data, such as the purposes or
subjective intentions of the Framers or ratifiers, as more than merely pieces of evidence
concerning the ordinary meanings of the Constitution's words - a view I reject. Hence,
"wooden originalism," which is more compact (if less elegant) than, for example, "jurisprudence
of original semantic meaning."
9. This characterization of the Constitution is not uncontroversial. See, e.g., Perry, The
Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 551, 564 (1985) ("For the American polity, the constitutional text is not (simply)
a book of answers to particular questions .. . . It is, rather, a principal symbol of, perhaps the
principal symbol of, the aspirations of the tradition.") (footnotes omitted). Without meaning to
downplay the importance and complexity of this problem of characterization, I can only say
here that the Constitution looks very much like an instruction manual and very little like anything else.
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- that is, why they should follow the manual once they know what it says.
As Roger Pilon and others10 have persuasively argued, any claim that they
should is a normative statement about human conduct that requires a normative justification. It is not sufficient to say that public officials must treat the
Constitution as a first principle."1 That is true for wooden originalism as a
positive theory of interpretation but not for wooden originalism as a prescriptive theory of decision-making.
Having acknowledged that troublesome fact, I am going to avoid it by
the simple expedient of addressing the rest of my comments only to those
who are indeed interested in knowing what instructions the Constitution
gives. In particular, I speak to those who concede the interpretative primacy
of wooden originalism but think they can reconcile it with a Pilonesque view
of the Constitution's role in safeguarding economic liberties. I seek to expose
an oft-used but seldom acknowledged methodological gambit of theirs that
can make constitutionalism and libertarianism seem more harmonious than
they are.
I hasten to add that I will only be talking about constitutional constraints, or the relative lack thereof, on state economic regulation. Most
federal interference with economic activity is in fact an inviting target for a
wooden originalist broadside. Woodenness should not be confused with judicial restraint. Restraint is a conclusion, not a premise. If a proper reading of
the commerce clause dictates that large portions of the federal government
come crashing down, 2 the wooden originalist will obediently go play in the
rubble. But if the ghost of Lochner 3 should not haunt a wooden reading of
the commerce clause, neither should the ghost of Filburn14 haunt a wooden
reading of the ninth and fourteenth amendments. And there's those who
pledge allegiance both to the Constitution and to freedom from state regulation often resort, if only tacitly, to what might be called selective woodenness. They are solid oak when it comes to the commerce clause or separation
of powers, but rotting bark when it comes to the due process clause, the
privileges or immunities clause, or the ninth amendment, where moral,
political, and economic theory suddenly hold sway - much as Justice
Brennan stands as a mighty sequoia when the eleventh amendment is
invoked, only to wilt thereafter. This familiar selective or dualistic
interpretative approach finds support in the following simple but powerful

10. See, e.g., Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 603, 606-07, 613-19 (1985).
11. See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 383 (1981).
12. See Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, supra p. 5.
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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argument: Any text-based theory of interpretation assumes a measure of
linguistic determinacy. The assumption is correct, but only over a certain
range. At some point, even the most precise language will generate
ambiguity. Wooden originalism can therefore only be a first-cut interpretative
method. If it yields an answer, that answer must be respected. But, cautions
the dualist, one can be sure that particular constitutional provisions will, at
varying points, prove unyielding to wooden analysis. One must then employ
subsidiary or second-order interpretative principles that are not logically
derivable from wooden originalism. In these cases, where wooden originalism has had its chance and failed, there can by definition be no objection to,
for example, a second-order presumption in favor of whatever interpretation
best protects economic liberty. And, the dualist will continue, it just so happens that the Constitution's "open-ended" clauses are especially in need of
second-order supplementation. Thus, he will conclude, while pro-liberty interpretations of these provisions can perhaps be justified only by moral or
economic reasoning, they are nonetheless consistent with a wooden originalist methodology.
At first glance, the dualist's argument appears to raise only mechanical
rather than methodological issues. Any distinctively methodological
problems seem to be assumed away by the stipulation that meanings
genuinely fixed by wooden originalism must be accepted, leaving only the
straightforward, if often difficult, question whether one can in fact fix the
meanings. However, unfortunately for interpretative theory, this is only the
tip of the iceberg. If the wooden originalist wishes fully to refute the dualist's
argument, he must at some point address the fundamental methodological
question to which this discussion has been leading: Taking its own
substantive rules of interpretation as given, when can one say that wooden
originalism, or any other interpretative method, has or has not fixed a
provision's meaning? My remaining comments will try to explain this
question and to persuade you to worry about it as much as I have.
Language is only determinate over a certain range; one inevitably
encounters ambiguity at the margins. This is not a phenomenon unique to
textualism. Even the most elaborate moral or political theory will surely have
marginal areas where clear answers are not found. The critical question for
interpretative theory is where the margins must be drawn. As long as they are
far from the core, the overwhelming majority of cases can be decided by the
first-order interpretative method, and the choice of subsidiary or secondorder rules becomes relatively insignificant.
The integrity of an interpretative theory thus depends in large measure
on the location of the margins that mark out its sphere of competence. The
placement of the margins, in turn, depends both upon the theory's substan-
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tive rules of interpretation and upon how much information one requires
those rules to produce. Wooden originalism, and I suspect interpretative
theories generally, specify the first but not the second. That is, a theory of
interpretation necessarily tells you the kinds of things that count as evidence
for and against a particular answer, but it does not necessarily tell you how
much of that evidence you must have before you can judge an answer correct
or incorrect. Thus, the effectiveness of an interpretative theory will be
profoundly affected by the independent selection of a proper evidentiary
standard. To illustrate, if an interpretation of the Constitution is correct only
when all other interpretations can be ruled out beyond a reasonable doubt,
then I think it clear that wooden originalism cannot fix the meaning of, for
example, the privileges or immunities clause; surely there is more than one
interpretation that can be advanced with a straight face. Accordingly, if the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is appropriate, the wooden originalist
cannot object to, even if he is not compelled to endorse, selection of whatever
linguistically defensible interpretation of the privileges or immunities clause
best protects economic freedom. If one lowers the evidentiary threshold and
allows interpretations to be validated or invalidated by clear and convincing
evidence or a preponderance of the evidence, the extent to which wooden
originalism is indeterminate, and therefore the need for second-order
principles and presumptions, narrows considerably, though it is possible that
no single interpretation of the privileges or immunities clause will satisfy
even this standard. And I submit without demonstrating that if the evidentiary
threshold is simply that an interpretation must be better than its available
alternatives, the zone of indeterminacy of a woodenly construed Constitution
gets very close to zero - as does the probability of finding broad founts of
economic liberty in the privileges or immunities clause.
The puzzling methodological problem, which interpretative theorists of
all stripes seem pointedly to have ignored, is how to justify the selection of
any particular evidentiary threshold. I do not have a complete or even a good
answer, but the better-than-available-alternatives test seems to be the best
choice on general epistemological grounds. Very little human knowledge
meets the rigorous standards of arithmetic, and it makes no epistemological
sense to prescribe a standard that the human mind cannot satisfy. Our
judgments are always made in particular contexts, and they are correct in
those contexts if they are the best integrations of the broadest array of
evidence available to us at the time. The level of confidence we can have in

15. See generally United States Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Wrong
Turns on the Road to Judicial Activism: The Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause 28-98 (1987).
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our judgments has to vary along a continuum with the strength and breadth of
the evidence, but once we have made the best call possible, it is irrational to
criticize the best for failing to be the unattainably perfect. In other words,
close counts in horseshoes, hand grenades, Ronnie Garvin's hands of
stone, 6 and unfortunately, interpreting the economic liberties provisions of
the Constitution.

16. Ronnie Garvin, "the man with the hands of stone," is a professional wrestler noted
for his ability to flatten opponents with blows that visibly miss by several inches.

